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Hospital Property Tax Exemption in Illinois:
Exploring the Policy Gaps
John D. Colombo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Illinois recently made the national press in the tax exemption world.'
As a result of a recommendation from the Champaign County Board of
Review (Board of Review) 2 in 2004, the Illinois Department of
Revenue (Department of Revenue) revoked the property tax exemption
for Provena Covenant Medical Center in Urbana, Illinois.3 In April
2005, the Board of Review made a similar recommendation for Carle
Hospital in Urbana, which at the time of the writing of this Article was
still pending before the Department of Revenue. In each case, the
Board of Review found that the hospitals failed their charity-care
obligations to the population by billing all patients, including the
uninsured poor, for services and then pursuing aggressive debt
collection techniques against them.5 In addition, the Board of Review
complained that each hospital had entered into complex joint venture
and contractual arrangements with for-profit doctor groups and other
entities, violating the "exclusive use" requirement of Illinois law.
6
The story about the tax exemption woes of these two hospitals has
been the subject of two articles in the Wall Street Journal,7 two in USA
* Professor and Thomas M. Mengler Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law. The
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1. See infra notes 7-9 (listing the newspaper and magazine articles that have been written
about the property tax exemption issues concerning Provena Covenant Medical Center and Carle
Hospital).
2. The Board of Review is a citizens' board that reviews local property tax issues including
property tax exemptions.
3. CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, NOTES ON EXEMPT APPLICATIONS 6-7 (2004),
http://www.co.champaign.il.us/SOAOFF/PROVENA.pdf [hereinafter PROVENA FILING].
4. CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, NOTES ON EXEMPT APPLICATIONS 8-9 (2005),
http://www.co.champaign.il.us/BOR/CARLE2004.pdf [hereinafter CARLE FILING].
5. CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 9-10; PROVENA FILING, supra note 3, at 5.
6. CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 4-6; PROVENA FILING, supra note 3, at 2-4.
7. Lucette Lagnado, A Nonprofit Hospital Fights to Win Back Charitable Halo, WALL ST. J.,
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89Today,8 and one in Modem Healthcare magazine. 9 Stan Jenkins, the
chairman of the Board of Review, was invited to Washington, D.C. to
testify before the House Ways and Means Committee regarding the
Board's findings in the two cases.10 Unfortunately, the sound bites
captured by the press failed to unravel the complex issues raised by the
current tax exemption controversies. Accordingly, this Article attempts
to do so. Part II reviews the federal rules for the exemption of hospitals
and health care providers under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code)
§ 501(c)(3)." Parts III and IV then turn to an analysis of the recent
Illinois cases dealing with the property tax exemption for health care
providers, 12 the open issues presented by those cases, and the open
policy issues raised by those decisions.13 This Article suggests that the
courts have failed to analyze serious health and tax policy issues
surrounding the tax exemption for hospitals and offers parameters of
debate or solutions to these policy questions.
II. TAX EXEMPTION BACKGROUND: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
Tax exemption is a complicated world because in most cases
"exemption" involves at least three, sometimes four, separate taxes
imposed by at least two separate taxing jurisdictions. At the federal
level, hospitals usually try to qualify for federal income tax exemption
under § 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C. as "charitable" organizations. 14  But
June 29, 2004, at BI (discussing Provena Covenant Medical Center's fight to regain its local
property-tax exemption); Lucette Lagnado, Hospital Found 'Not Charitable' Loses Its Status As
Tax Exempt, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at BI (discussing Provena Covenant Medical Center's
loss of its tax-exempt status).
8. Julie Appleby, Hospital Suits Fall Flat But Debate Rages, USA TODAY, Apr. 25, 2005, at
4B (discussing the Champaign County Board of Review's recommendation to deny the Carle
Foundation a property tax exemption); Julie Appleby, Non-Profit Hospitals' Top Salaries May Be
Due for a Check-up, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 2004, at I B (stating that hospital executives make
well over six figure salaries and that many hospitals offer no discounts or charity care).
9. Mark Taylor, Board Tries to Revoke Status, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 25, 2005, at 4
(noting that a year after the Illinois Department of Revenue revoked Provena Covenant Medical
Center's property tax exemption, the Champaign County (Ill.) Board of Review recommended
denial of Carle Foundation Hospital's property tax exemption).
10. Hearing on the Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. (May 26, 2005) (statement of Stan Jenkins, Chairman, Champaign County Board of
Review) available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov (follow "hearings" hyperlink; then follow
"5-26-2005 Hearing on Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector" hyperlink; then follow "Stan Jenkins"
hyperlink) [hereinafter Jenkins Statement].
11. See infra Part II (discussing the Internal Revenue Code's rules for the exemption of
hospitals and health care providers).
12. See infra Part III (discussing the Illinois property tax exemption).
13. See infra Part IV (analyzing the policy issues raised by recent Illinois property tax
exemption decisions).
14. See infra Part II.A-C (discussing the three most important issues that hospitals face in
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hospitals must also contend with up to three separate state taxes. In
Illinois, these taxes are the income tax, property tax, and sales tax.
15
Because the federal and state governments are each sovereign entities in
imposing their taxes, the exemption standards for these various taxes
often differ. While state income tax exemptions typically track federal
standards under § 501(c)(3), 16 property and sales tax exemptions
generally follow different rules.
17
Because the Illinois property tax exemption is at the heart of the
recent Provena Covenant and Carle tax controversies, this Article
focuses primarily on the recent interpretations of the Illinois property
tax exemption with respect to hospitals. 18  Nevertheless, some
understanding of the federal income tax exemption standard is
necessary to fully appreciate the unanswered policy questions presented
by recent Illinois property tax exemption precedents.
Hospitals are not specifically enumerated as exempt entities
anywhere in the I.R.C. Historically, however, nonprofit hospitals have
been recognized as exempt as "charitable organizations" under §
501(c)(3). While there are a number of requirements for exempt
status under this section, the most important issues with respect to
hospitals have been showing (1) that the hospital pursues a charitable20 2 1
purpose; (2) an absence of "private inurement"; and (3) an absenceof "private benefit."22
becoming exempt as "charitable organizations" under the Internal Revenue Code).
15. See infra Part III (discussing the Illinois property tax exemption).
16. In Illinois, for example, 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/205 bases state income tax exemption on
federal exempt status under § 501 of the I.R.C.
17. In Illinois, the standards for property tax exemption are set forth in 35 ILL. COMP. STAT.
200/15-65. Sales tax exemptions are outlined in 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1. Neither of these
sections in any way cross-references federal law.
18. See infra Part II (discussing the Illinois property tax exemption).
19. Administrative rulings on tax exemption for hospitals date back at least to 1928. E.g., I.T.
2421, VII-28-3796 C.B. 150 (1928) (holding that the private hospital, the "M Company," is not
exempt from federal income taxation).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990).
21. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
22. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii). In addition to these three requirements, federal law mandates
certain "organizational" requirements for an exempt charity-requiring that the organizing
documents of the charity contain special language to ensure that if the organization dissolves, its
assets will go to another charity. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1). Code § 501(c)(3) also limits political
lobbying activity and prohibits political campaign activity. Court interpretations of charitable
status under the Code also prohibit a charitable organization from engaging in illegal activity or
activities contrary to established public policy, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983) (finding a racially discriminatory school not exempt because racial discrimination
violates fundamental public policy), and limit the amount of commercial activity an organization
can pursue, see John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM.
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A. Charitable Purpose: The Community Benefit Test
Prior to 1969, the official position of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS or Service) regarding the charitable purpose requirement as it
applied to hospitals was set forth in Revenue Ruling 56-185. This
ruling required a hospital seeking exemption under § 501(c)(3) to be
"operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay
for the services rendered. ' 23  While the Service never took an official
position regarding how much charity care was "enough," or even how
to define charity care for these purposes, if a hospital lacked a
substantial charity care program, auditing agents almost always
recommended denial or revocation of exempt status.24 This charity care
standard reflected the long-held stance of the IRS (and centuries of legal
precedent in the charitable trust arena) that the "relief of the poor"
constituted a charitable purpose.
25
& MARY L. REV. 487 (2002) (discussing commercial activity conducted by charities and its
relation to tax exemptions). Thus, one might organize the legal tests for exemption as follows. In
order to be exempt, an organization must first show that it is properly organized as a nonprofit
and then must show that it pursues a recognized charitable purpose under Code § 501(c)(3), such
as relief of the poor or educating the public. If the organization passes that hurdle, it must also
show that it does not run afoul of six separate limitations on exemption, which are: (1) the "public
policy/illegality" doctrine; (2) private inurement/intermediate sanctions; (3) private benefit; (4)
the "commerciality" limitation; (5) no "substantial" lobbying; and (6) no participation in a
political campaign. For more general discussions of the requirements for exemption under Code
§ 501(c)(3) and these limitations, see FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION
OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2002); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (7th ed. 1998). With respect to tax exemption for hospitals in particular, see
THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2001); DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATIONS (2001). As the text notes, most of the disputes regarding federal tax
exemption for health care providers center on the definition of health care as a charitable purpose,
the private inurement limitation, and the private benefit limitation.
23. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202-203.
24. While the ruling recognized that this test would be applied on all the facts and
circumstances (and that a low charity care record would not necessarily bar exemption), IRS
auditing agents often denied or revoked exempt status if a hospital's charity care was less than
5% of gross revenues. Hospital Charity Care and Tax Exempt Status: Restoring the Commitment
and Fairness: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong. 58 (1990) (statement of
James J. McGovern, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel); Robert S. Bromberg, Charity and Change:
Current Problems of Tax Exempt Health and Welfare Organizations in Perspective, in TAX
PROBLEMS OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 249, 256 (1970).
25. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(2) (listing "relief of the poor and distressed" as a
charitable purpose). Historically, relief of the poor has been viewed as a charitable purpose at
least since the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses enacted by the English Parliament in 1601.
The preamble to that statute, which is generally viewed as the "headwaters" of charitable trust
law, listed "relief of aged, impotent and poor people" as an appropriate charitable purpose. See
JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 34 (1995) (discussing
the impact of the Statute of Charitable Uses on charitable trust law). The official citation for the
Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses is An Act to Redress the Mis-Employment of Lands, Goods
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Concurrent with Congressional consideration of the Medicare and
Medicaid legislation in the mid-1960s, however, exempt hospitals
began pushing the IRS for reconsideration of exemption standards on
the grounds that between private medical insurance and the "new"
Medicare and Medicaid programs, there simply would not be enough of
a demand for charity care to satisfy the IRS, and hence exemption
standards should become more flexible in order to maintain exempt
status for hospitals.26 A staff attorney with the IRS apparently took the
complaints of the hospital industry seriously and began work on a new
exemption standard.
The new standard appeared in Revenue Ruling 69-545, which quickly
became known as the "community benefit" standard. This ruling
abandoned charity care as the touchstone of exemption at the federal
level. Instead, citing the law of charitable trusts, the IRS held that the
"promotion of health" for the general benefit of the community was
itself a charitable purpose, even though some portion of the community,
such as the uninsured, was excluded. 29  Factors that indicated that a
hospital met the community benefit test included a community board, an
open medical staff, treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients, and
operation of an emergency room that provided emergency treatment to
charity patients. 30  Charity care other than emergency treatment,
however, was not required; and in a 1983 ruling, the IRS held that
hospitals without emergency facilities could qualify for exemption
under the community benefit approach.
31
Despite the 1969 and 1983 rulings, recent cases dealing with tax
exemption for health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have made
and Stock of Money Heretofore Given to Certain Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4, reprinted
in 7 STAT. AT LARGE 43 (Eng. 1763).
26. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals, The
Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 251, 261-62, 269-70
(1991). In retrospect, of course, this complaint is almost hilarious for its inaccuracy. Recent
estimates put the number of uninsured Americans at forty-three million and climbing. BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 528 (5th ed. 2004).
27. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 26, at 269-70.
28. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. For more general discussions of Rev. Rul. 69-545,
see MANCINO, supra note 22, at §§ 4.03[1], 4.03[2][b]; and HYAT & HOPKINS, supra note 22, at
130-32.
29. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 118.
30. Id. An "open medical staff' for these purposes refers to permitting all doctors with proper
credentials to admit and treat patients at the hospital. HYATI" & HOPKINS, supra note 22, at 171.
31. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. This ruling held that if emergency services were
deemed unnecessary by state regulatory agencies or by the nature of the hospital's services (e.g.,
cancer treatment hospitals), a hospital still could qualify for exemption under the community
benefit approach, even though it did not operate emergency facilities.
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clear that the federal test for exemption requires more than simply
treating all patients who can pay for their care either directly or via
private or government insurance. 32 In the most recent of these cases,
dealing with subsidiary corporations of the Intermountain Health Care
group, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated
plainly that "an organization cannot satisfy the community-benefit
requirement based solely on the fact that it offers health-care services to
all in the community in exchange for a fee .... Rather, the organization
must provide some additional 'plus."' 33  First on the list of these
"pluses" was "free or below-cost services," though the court
acknowledged that "devoting surpluses to research, education and
medical training" might also suffice, and that treatment of Medicare and
Medicaid patients was a virtual requirement.
34
Thus, the federal test for exempting health care providers requires an
exempt provider to have a community board, treat Medicare and
Medicaid patients along with all privately insured patients (an "open
door" policy), and engage in some other significant community "plus"
such as community outreach programs, health education, health
research, and/or charity care (of which free emergency room care may
be a part). Moreover, despite recent emphasis in the case law on charity
care as the biggest "plus" factor in the "health care plus" formulation of
the community benefit test, there is still no absolute requirement in
federal law that a hospital engage in free care for the poor (beyond
providing free care in the emergency room, if the entity in question
provides emergency services) in order to be exempt under federal law.
B. Private Inurement
Pursuing a charitable purpose is not sufficient to insure exempt status
under federal law. Rather, an organization seeking exemption must
comply with various limitations on the conduct of tax-exempt entities.
The two requirements most often at issue with respect to hospitals and
other health care providers are the "private inurement" limitation
contained in the statutory language in § 501(c)(3) and the "private
benefit" limitation that has arisen from various cases and IRS
interpretations.
The private inurement prohibition is the federal statutory method of
32. For a complete discussion of the cases and rulings relating to federal income tax
exemption for health care providers after Rev. Rul. 69-545, see John D. Colombo, The Failure of
Community Benefit, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 29, 32-37 (2005).
33. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003).
34. Id. at 1197-98 ("[T]he primary way in which health-care providers advance government-
funded endeavors is the servicing of the Medicaid and Medicare populations.").
[Vol. 37
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requiring that an exempt organization be "nonprofit" in the sense of not
distributing earnings to private individuals. 3T IRS rulings and cases
agree that the substance of this limitation is that the economic benefits
of exemption cannot be "siphoned off' to managers, board members, or
other "insiders."36 Or, put another way, private inurement occurs when
an exempt organization fails to get fair value in return for an economic
transfer to a private individual who is an "insider." 37  Until the
enactment of § 4958 in 1996, the IRS's enforcement tools for violations
of the private inurement limitation were limited to revocation of exempt
status and/or closing agreements with an exempt entity.
3 8
Most cases of private inurement are not subtle. They involve
situations in which insiders are provided with property or services at
below-market rates (e.g., a below-market loan, use of property at below-
market rent, a sale of property by the exempt entity to the insider at less
than full fair-market-value) or where an insider overcharges the entity
for services or property provided to the entity (e.g., unreasonable
compensation, a sale of property by the insider to the entity at greater
than fair-market-value, use of property provided by the insider at greater
than market rental rates). Thus, in Lorain Avenue Clinic v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court found prohibited private inurement in a
compensation arrangement that divided profits from the operation of a
medical clinic among the controlling doctors.3 9  Similarly, in Sonora
Community Hospital v. Commissioner, the Tax Court prohibited a
private inurement arrangement that permitted the founding and
35. As Henry Hansmann noted many years ago, the essence of nonprofit status is the
"nondistribution constraint." That is, a nonprofit organization can indeed make a profit in the
sense of having net earnings for the year. What it cannot do is distribute that profit to equity
owners or other private individuals. Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 840 (1980). State nonprofit organization law usually incorporates the
nondistribution constraint as a result of nonprofit corporation statutes or the common law of
charitable trusts; the private inurement prohibition is the Code's method of expressing this same
concept in § 501 (c)(3).
36. For a list of common inurement transactions and the IRS rulings and cases on these
transactions, see HILL & MANCINO, supra note 22, at 4.03[7] and John D. Colombo, Private
Benefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Healthcare as an Exempt Purpose, 34 J. HEALTH L.
505, 507 (2001).
37. See United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
a charity may not siphon its earnings to anyone described as an insider, including its founder and
members of its board).
38. Today, the intermediate sanctions statute has all but displaced private inurement as a
limitation on exempt status. While the IRS still can revoke exempt status for inurement
transactions, I.R.C. § 4958 has displaced revoking exemption in all but the most egregious cases.
See infra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining the replacement of the private inurement
doctrine by the intermediate sanctions regime).
39. Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 141, 160 (1958).
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controlling doctors to receive one-third of the gross receipts from
privately-operated x-ray and laboratory departments for which the
doctors performed no services. 40  A more recent example is the 1994
revocation of exemption for LAC Facilities, Inc. (LACF), a health care
provider in Florida. There, the IRS cited payment of excessive
compensation to LACF's executives by an insurance company affiliated
with LACF, payment of lump sum retirement benefits to LACF
executives during a time when they were ineligible for such benefits,
payment of personal food and liquor expenses of LACF executives, and
other excessive payments. 4 1  On the other hand, where an economic
arrangement between an exempt entity and unrelated parties is
negotiated at arm's length, private inurement will not exist even if the
arrangement might be considered a "bad deal" for the exempt charity.
42
Today, the private inurement doctrine largely has been displaced by the
intermediate sanctions regime enacted as § 4958 of the I.R.C.43
Nevertheless, as noted below in Part III, state property tax exemption
standards set forth by Illinois courts include a concept very similar to
the federal private inurement doctrine, and thus the doctrine remains
relevant today.
C. Private Benefit
By far, the more important of the two conduct limitations is the
private benefit doctrine. This is unfortunate because "private benefit" is
a much harder doctrine to define precisely. Unlike private inurement,
which is part of the statutory language in § 501(c)(3), the phrase
"private benefit" does not appear anywhere in the statute. The
regulations, moreover, contain only a vague reference to the doctrine.
40. Sonora Cmty. Hosp. v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 519, 526-27 (1966).
41. Bernadette M. Broccolo & Michael W. Peregrine, Bad Doctor Deals Place Hospitals at
New Risk Part ll-The LAC Facilities, Inc. Revocation, 11 EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 267, 268
(1995).
42. United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1174-75 (stating that an arrangement between a
charity and private fundraiser giving fundraiser 90% of gross proceeds did not constitute private
inurement because contract was negotiated at arm's length and the fundraiser was not an insider
of the exempt charity).
43. Section 4958 provides for excise taxes on an "excess benefits transaction," defined as a
transaction in which "the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the
consideration (including the performance of services) received." 26 U.S.C § 4958 (2000). This
is the § 4958 analog to the "siphoning off' concept in private inurement. Excess benefit
transactions can occur only between an exempt organization and a "disqualified person," defined
as a person who, during the preceding five years, was "in a position to exercise substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization." This is the § 4958 analog to the "insider" concept.
While the IRS retains authority to revoke exempt status for inurement transactions, most
observers agree that revocation will be a "last resort" sanction for inurement-type transactions.
[Vol. 37
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Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)- 1 (d)(1)(ii) state that an organization
will not meet exemption requirements "unless it serves a public rather
than a private interest," and that the organization seeking exemption
must establish "that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of
private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his
family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly
or indirectly, by such private interests."
44
The concept of private benefit appears to have originated in the
common law of charitable trusts, which required a charitable trust to
serve a broad charitable class rather than specific individuals.45 In the
early 1980s, however, the IRS began to use the private benefit concept
in a far more expansive way, asserting that it was an independent
limitation on exemption.46  Under this broader interpretation, private
benefit prohibits exempt organizations from engaging in certain
economic transactions with individuals outside the charitable class
when such individuals receive economic benefits that are more than
incidentally necessary to the performance of the exempt organization's
charitable mission. For example, in General Counsel's Memorandum
39,598, the IRS found that a proposed rental of office building space by
a subsidiary of an exempt hospital to a group of doctors was
inconsistent with exempt status. Basing its decision explicitly on the
private benefit doctrine, the IRS stated,
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it serves a
private interest more than incidentally. .. . If, however, the private
benefit is only incidental to the exempt purposes served, and not
substantial, it will not result in a loss of exempt status .... A private
benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental in both a
qualitative and a quantitative sense. In order to be incidental in a
qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the
activity that benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity can be
accomplished only by benefiting certain private individuals.... To be
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1990). One could make a fairly
strong textual argument that this language in the regulations is intended to do nothing more than
explain the "private inurement" prohibition contained in the statute. As the text notes, however,
the Service has viewed "private benefit" as a separate limitation on exempt status since at least
the 1970s, and the Tax Court officially accepted this concept in the American Campaign Academy
case decided in 1989. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
American Campaign Academy case.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 369 cmt. h (1959); GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS
201-203 (6th ed. 1987); AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
369.5 (4th ed. 1987). See generally Colombo, supra note 36, at 507 (explaining that a trust, at
common law, is charitable only if it provides a benefit to the general public).
46. See infra text at notes 48-52 (discussing a case wherein such an independent limitation on
exemption was asserted).
2006]
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incidental in a quantitative sense, the private benefit must not be
substantial after considering the overall public benefit conferred by the
activity.
47
In American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,48 decided in
1989, the Tax Court accepted the view that private benefit was an
independent limitation on economic benefits that could flow to
individuals outside the charitable class. In that case, the court analyzed
whether a school that trained individuals to be political campaign
professionals qualified as a tax-exempt educational institution.
Although the school clearly served a large charitable class (e.g., it did
not limit admissions to particular individuals) 49 and also clearly met the
tests for an educational organization under § 501(c)(3), 50 the Tax Court
used the private benefit doctrine to hold that the organization was not
exempt. Noting that most of the school's graduates worked for the
Republican Party or its related entities, the court found that the school
benefited the private interests of the Republican Party to an
impermissible degree and hence was not exempt, even though no
evidence of traditional private inurement existed.51 In the course of the
opinion, the Tax Court accepted the IRS argument that the "secondary"
benefits flowing to the Republican Party as a result of the school's
operation were not incidental to the primary educational benefits
flowing to students.
52
American Campaign Academy firmly established private benefit as a
key limitation on exempt status under federal law, and the IRS took full
advantage. In 1990, the Service used the private benefit analysis to
reject revenue stream joint venture arrangements between hospitals and
doctors. 53  These arrangements, in which hospitals would "spin off'
certain outpatient services to a joint venture between the hospital and
doctors, were used by hospitals as a means of increasing utilization of
hospital facilities by giving doctors a direct economic stake in the "spun
off' facility.54 The hope was that the participating doctors would refer
47. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
48. 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989).
49. Id. at 1058. The court's opinion indicated some skepticism regarding whether the school
took students who did not have Republican Party affiliations, but the record did not indicate such
a limitation, and the IRS conceded that the Academy did not discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin. Id.
50. The IRS conceded this point. Id. at 1063.
51. Id. at 1074-79.
52. Id.
53, See infra text at notes 54-58 (discussing I.R.S. General Counsel Memorandum 39,862).
54. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991); see MANCINO, supra note 22, § 19.04
(noting that net revenue stream joint ventures were used by hospitals as a means of "solidifying a
[Vol. 37
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more patients to the facility, thus increasing revenues to the hospital.55
In General Counsel's Memorandum 39,862 (GCM 39,862) the IRS
ruled that these arrangements violated the private benefit doctrine
because the direct and substantial financial benefit to the participating
doctors could not be justified as "incidental" to the hospital's mission of
providing health services to the community.5 6  According to the
Service, "[o]btaining referrals or avoiding new competition may
improve the competitive position of an individual hospital, but that is
not necessarily the same as benefiting its community." 7 The Service,
however, indicated in an earlier part of the GCM 39,862 that if a joint
venture was needed to expand health care resources in the area, create a
new provider, reduce treatment costs, or provide new treatment
modalities, then the arrangement might pass muster.
58
The private benefit analysis also played a key role in two major
healthcare exemption rulings released by the IRS in the late 1990's.
Revenue Ruling 97-21, dealing with physician recruitment, involved
two separate situations.5 9 The first concerned financial incentives to
recruit a physician to be an employee of a hospital or other provider,
and the second related to financial incentives to recruit doctors to the
community to be on staff but not as employees of the hospital.60 While
private inurement analysis controlled the first situation, the IRS relied
on private benefit analysis in the second, holding that reasonable
incentives would be permitted when the recruitment was justified by
community need, expanding services provided by the hospital, or
providing new services to the community.
6 1
In the second major ruling, Revenue Ruling 98-15, the IRS examined
the "whole hospital joint venture" transaction in which an existing
exempt hospital corporation would contribute all its assets (the hospital
building, equipment, contracts with staff and providers, etc.) to a joint
referral base or deterring the physicians from establishing their own competing facilities and
services").
55. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862; MANCINO, supra note 22, § 19.04.
56. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862.
57. Id.
58. Id. The IRS stated:
We recognize that there may well be legitimate purposes for joint ventures, whether
analyzed under the anti-kickback statute or the tax Code. These may include raising
needed capital; bringing new services or a new provider to a hospital's community;
sharing the risk inherent in a new activity, or pooling diverse areas of expertise.
Id.
59. Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see MANCINO, supra note 22, § 20.02[4][f] (discussing Revenue Ruling 97-12).
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venture with a for-profit hospital chain. 6 2 Typically, these transactions
were structured as fifty-fifty partnerships, with the for-profit provider
contributing cash to the deal equal to the value of the assets contributed
by the exempt partner, and a for-profit management company (usually
affiliated in some way with the for-profit partner) would manage the
business via a contract with the partnership. 63  Using private benefit
analysis as its main analytical tool, the IRS concluded that these whole-
hospital joint venture arrangements were consistent with exempt status
only if the exempt partner retained control over the management of the
joint venture, a position later upheld by the courts.64 The Service noted
that in cases where the exempt organization did not retain management
control, it could not initiate programs to meet the health needs of its
community, and other community-benefit programs such as free care
for the poor could be terminated. As in GCM 39,862, the IRS refused
to view the economic advantages of the joint venture arrangement as a
sufficient counterbalance to the private benefits flowing to the for-profit
partner and the for-profit management company.
66
At present, therefore, the private benefit analysis seems to boil down
to the following: when an exempt organization enters into a transaction
that results in a substantial economic benefit flowing to a private
individual or entity not a part of the charitable class, the exempt
organization must justify why that transaction is needed to perform the
exempt organization's charitable function. In the health care world,
where this doctrine has been used the most, the appropriate
justifications will involve enhancing health services to the
community-providing new services, new treatment modalities, and
enhanced access to previously-restricted services. The economic
convenience of the exempt entity will not be a sufficient justification;
and therefore, enhancing profitability alone will not satisfy this test.
67
62. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
63. For extended discussions of this ruling, see MANCINO, supra note 22, § 19.04[5][a] and
HYATr & HOPKINS, supra note 22, at 373-78.
64. E.g., St. David's Health Care Sys., Inc. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the court presumes that an organization furthers the private individuals' for-profit
motivation when a nonprofit organization forms a partnership with a for-profit entity); Redlands
Surgical Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), affd 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying
a three prong test: (1) whether the organization organized and operated exclusively for a
charitable purpose; (2) whether promotion of health for the benefit of the community is a
charitable purpose; and (3) whether the organization operates exclusively for exempt purposes or
if it operates for the benefit of private interests).
65. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
66. Id.
67. On the other hand, there is some suggestion, by inference, in GCM 39,862 that if the
exempt organization could make a credible case that medical services would be irreparably
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D. Summary
To summarize, for a hospital to maintain exempt status under federal
law, it must meet the community benefit test of charitable purpose,
which in its current incarnation appears to be a "health care plus"
68standard. This means that the hospital must have a community board
and treat all patients able to pay, including Medicare and Medicaid
patients, and then provide some significant community plus, such as
charity care for the poor, an open emergency room, medical research,
education programs, or medical outreach programs. Charity care,
however, is not an absolute requirement for exemption under federal
law; it is simply one of several items that can constitute the appropriate
"plus" factor. In addition, an exempt entity must avoid transactions that
involve private inurement or private benefit.
69
III. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION
As the discussion below will illustrate, Illinois property tax
exemption law has some requirements that are similar to federal
exemption provisions, but also some that are different. In certain
situations, though, Illinois law might do well to adopt aspects of federal
exemption rules.
A. Illinois Constitutional and Statutory Law
As in many states, Illinois property tax exemption law begins with
the Illinois Constitution. Article IX, Section 6 of the 1970 Constitution
states "[t]he General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only
the property of the State, units of local government and school districts
and property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural
societies, and for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes."
70
The statutory execution of this grant provides a property tax exemption
for property "actually and exclusively used for charitable or beneficent
purposes" by institutions of public charity.
71
reduced absent a particular transaction, such an argument might carry the day. In this situation,
the exempt organization would not be using the joint venture "simply as a means to attract, retain,
or reward physicians in order to attract the patients they will refer..." but rather to maintain a
service level for the benefit of the community. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
So far, however, neither the IRS nor courts have ruled on such a case.
68. See supra Part II.A (discussing the charitable purpose that requires an organization to
provide healthcare services to all in the community as well as some additional plus factors to
qualify for exempt status).
69. See supra Part II.B-C (discussing the private inurement and private benefits doctrines).
70. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
71. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-65 (2004).
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B. Hospital Exemption Case Law
As with federal income tax exemption, hospitals are not specifically
listed as exempt organizations, but Illinois courts have recognized the
exempt status of nonprofit hospitals as "charities" since the early
1900s. 72  In these early cases, the Department of Revenue contended
that a hospital that charged for its services was not an "institution of
public charity." 73 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, concluded that
hospitals would be exempt even if they charged those patients who were
able to pay, so long as the hospital provided charity care to all patients
who needed it and treated all patients on a nondiscriminatory basis.
74
After these cases, property tax exemption for hospitals went virtually
unquestioned under Illinois law for almost eighty years. Then a funny
thing happened on the way to the operating room. In 1987, the Second
District Court of Appeals considered a case in which Highland Park
Hospital sought exemption for certain portions of a building it owned in
Long Grove, Illinois.' Part of the building was used as an "Immediate
Care Center," a walk-in clinic operated by the hospital and its staff
doctors to treat minor emergencies and illnesses, which the hospital
argued was exempt.76  In analyzing the Immediate Care Center's
eligibility for exemption, the court turned to criteria to identify
"charitable organizations" laid out by the Illinois Supreme Court in the
1968 case Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen." In that case, the
72. E.g., Bd. of Review v. Provident Hosp. & Training Sch. Ass'n, 84 N.E. 216 (Dl. 1908)
(holding that Provident Hospital was tax exempt); German Hosp. v. Bd. of Review, 84 N.E. 215
(I11. 1908) (holding that the German Hospital was tax exempt); Sisters of the Third Order v. Bd.
of Review, 83 N.E. 272 (I11. 1907) (holding that St. Francis hospital was tax exempt). Certain
health maintenance organizations are specifically listed as exempt in 35 ILL. COMP. STAT.
200/15-65(d) (2004).
73. E.g., Sisters of the Third Order, 83 N.E. at 273-74 ("It is then argued that this hospital
should not be held to be an institution of public charity by reason of the great disparity between
the number of charity patients and those who pay for the care and attention they receive at this
institution.").
74. "Those who are without money or property are cared for without charge.... In this
hospital, charity is extended to all the members of the community and is not confined to any
particular class of individuals." Id. at 273. "[Tlhe hospital makes the usual and reasonable
charge for its accommodations to patients coming to it who are financially able to pay, but.., it
receives all patients who apply, without reference to their financial circumstances or ability to pay
its charges, and without distinction as to race, color or religion, or any other distinction[.]"
German Hosp., 84 N.E. at 216. "[A]II persons ... who are in need of medical or surgical
attention, who apply, are received into the hospital and treated and cared for without regard to
whether they have means to pay for such care and treatment or not[.]" Provident Hosp. &
Training Sch. Ass'n, 84 N.E. at 216. In each of these cases, moreover, the record showed that the
hospital in question treated a significant number of charity patients.
75. Highland Park Hosp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 507 N.E.2d 1331 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987).
76. Id. at 1333.
77. 233 N.E.2d 537 (I11. 1968).
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court identified six factors relevant to charitable status:
The property in question must be used "for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons... for their general welfare-or in some way
reducing the burdens of government";
the charitable institution must have no capital, capital stock or
shareholders, and earns no profits or dividends;
it "derives its funds mainly from public and private charity";
the institution "dispenses charity to all who need and apply for it, does
not provide gain or profit in a private sense to any person connected
with it, and does not appear to place obstacles of any character in the
way of those who need [charitable services]";
the institution has the burden of proving that its property actually and
factually is so used; and
the term "exclusively used" means the primary purpose for which
property is used and not any secondary or incidental purpose.
7 8
The Second District found fault with Highland Park Hospital's
exemption request under the fourth factor. Noting that "[a]ll patients
who utilize the Immediate Care Center are billed" and that "[f]ree or
charitable care is not mentioned," the court held that the Immediate
Care Center did not "dispense charity to all those who need or apply for
it."'79 The court also rejected Highland Park Hospital's claim that its
uncollectible bad debts constituted charity care: "On these facts, we
conclude that the small amount of uncollectible bills ... which are only
classified as free care when ultimately determined to be uncollectible,
does not entitle plaintiffs to a charitable exemption .... ,,80
The Second District's analysis went relatively unnoticed until 1993,
when the Department of Revenue denied a property tax exemption to
Alivio Medical Center (Alivio), which operated an ambulatory medical
center in Cook County.8 ' Although targeted specifically at the Hispanic
community, Alivio's services were available on a nondiscriminatory
basis to anyone.8 2 Its billing practices, however, were the source of the
exemption dispute. Alivio never waived fees up-front and did not
78. Id. at 541-42. In Highland Park, the Second District characterized the Methodist Old
Peoples Home test as having five factors, combining factors (2) and (3) into one. Highland Park
Hosp., 507 N.E.2d at 1336. More recent cases, however, have separated these factors. See Eden
Ret. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 821 N.E.2d 240, 248 (I1. 2004) (citing Methodist Old Peoples
Home and using all six factors); Riverside Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 795 N.E.2d 361, 365-
67 (II1. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2003) (listing all six factors).
79. Highland Park Hosp., 507 N.E.2d at 1336-37.
80. Id. at 1336.
81. Alivio Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 702 N.E.2d 189, 190 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
82. Id.
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advertise or inform patients that it had any charity care program. 83
Instead, it billed all patients for services rendered and expected payment
on the day of the patient's visit.84 Those patients who could not pay
immediately were billed on thirty-day cycles. 85 If the bill was not
collected after 180 days (six billing notices), the unpaid portion of the
account could be written off as a bad debt by approval of Alivio's
Director of Finance and Executive Director. The Department of
Revenue concluded that Alivio was not a charity because of these
billing practices and the fact that Alivio had a net profit of $138,256 for
the year in question.87 After a failed administrative appeal, the case
went to the Illinois Appellate Court.
88
The First District agreed with the Department of Revenue that the
profit reported by Alivio was inconsistent with the second item in the
Methodist Old Peoples Home test, and that Alivio's billing practices
were inconsistent with the requirement of dispensing charity to all who
need it.89 Echoing the Second District's opinion in Highland Park, the
court stated that "writing off a bad debt is not tantamount to providing
charity. These were amounts which Alivio was unable to collect, not
charity." 90 As a result, the court upheld the denial of an exemption to
Alivio.
Five years later, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
faced a similar case. 91 Riverside Medical Center (Riverside) owned a
hospital and eight medical clinics in and around Kankakee. 92 After the
Illinois Department of Revenue approved property tax exemptions for
all but certain property rented to private physicians, the Kankakee
County Board of Review requested an administrative review of the
exemptions. 93 The administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that
the exemptions for Riverside be denied, and after a lower court upheld
the exemptions for Riverside, the Board of Review appealed.94
Like the First and Second Districts, the Third District applied the six-
83. Id. at 192-93.
84. Id. at 191.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 191-92.
88. Id. at 191.
89. Id. at 192.
90. Id. at 193.
91. Riverside Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 795 N.E.2d 361 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2003)
92. Id. at 363.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 364.
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factor test from Methodist Old Peoples Home to Riverside. 95 Once
again, the issue of charity care and billing practices proved to be the
taxpayer's undoing. In a more detailed analysis than the First District's
in Alivio, the Third District found that Riverside did not discriminate in
its services and was properly formed as a nonprofit organization,
meeting parts one and two of the Methodist Old Peoples Home test.
96
Its billing practices, however, were inconsistent with the "dispense
charity" criterion.9 7 The court noted that, like Alivio, Riverside billed
all its patients for services, did not advertise a charity care program, and
did not provide any pre-care screening program to determine whether a
patient should be a charity patient.98 Citing Alivio and Highland Park
Hospital, the court determined that writing off bad debts is not the same
thing as providing charity care and that Riverside thus failed to meet
this criterion.99 The court also noted that another factor in Methodist
Old Peoples Home was whether the organization in question "derived
its funds from public or private charity."100 Finding that only .05% of
Riverside's income came from donations, the court ruled that Riverside
failed on this point as well. l01
Finally, the court appeared to agree with the ALJ's finding that
Riverside's reservation of 3% of its annual budget for charity was too
small an amount in comparison to paid revenues. 10 2  The court
characterized this as a "small percentage" and rejected Riverside's
argument that the discounted rates it gave to Medicare and Medicaid
patients should be considered part of its overall charity program. 103
The large insurers have negotiated preferential rates with Riverside,
but there is no indication that Riverside agreed to the arrangement in
pursuit of its charitable mission. It may be that Riverside agreed to
the rate discounts as a way of attracting a reliable stream of business
from patients insured by the large insurers. 104
Accordingly, the court held against Riverside.
95. Id. at 365.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 365-66.
99. Id. at 366.
100. Id. at 365.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 367.
103. id. at 366-67.
104. Id. at 367.
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IV. ANALYSIS: EXPLORING THE POLICY GAPS
Two parts of the Methodist Old Peoples Home test are
uncontroversial. The first factor simply restates a form of the
"community benefit" approach used in federal exemption law, requiring
providers to have an "open door" policy in treating all patients able to
pay for services. 105 Similarly, the second and part of the fourth factors
mirror the federal exemption requirements by prohibiting "private
inurement" through distributions of profit to private individuals and
requiring that exempt organizations adopt the nonprofit ownershipform. 106-
Beyond these issues, however, the courts' analyses in Highland Park,
Alivio, and Riverside raise some very troubling public policy issues that
the judges deciding these cases did not appear to think through
thoroughly. Below, this Article* examines several of these areas,
offering suggestions for possible policy solutions or the parameters for
future policy debate.
A. "Dispensing Charity": The Charity Care Element
As noted above, recent Illinois cases make clear that under the
"dispensing charity" element of the Methodist Old Peoples Home test,
some substantial charity care program is a necessary part of the
exemption analysis for hospitals.1 7 The cases also make clear that bad
debt write-offs will not qualify as charity care for this purpose. 10 8 This
court-crafted definition of the charity care requirement is what underlies
the Champaign County Board of Review's primary complaints against
Provena Covenant and Carle; in both cases, the Board of Review found
that the hospitals were providing too little "real" charity care and were
inappropriately counting bad-debt write-offs and contractual discounts
in their charity care reporting. 10 9  But a host of issues remain
unresolved, and even the positions that are clear raise some difficult
policy questions.
105. See supra Part II.A (describing the community benefit standard established by the IRS
and its application to nonprofit hospitals).
106. See supra Part II.B (defining private inurement prohibition as a ban on distributing
earnings to private individuals).
107. See supra Part IILB (describing Illinois cases that establish the requirement that
nonprofit hospitals dispense charity).
108. See supra Part Il1.B (noting that Illinois courts do not count bad debt write-offs to be
consistent with dispensing charity).
109. CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 8-9; PROVENA FILING, supra note 3, at 6-7. See Jenkins
Statement, supra note 10 (describing the actions taken against Provena Covenant Medical Center
and Carle Hospital).
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The unresolved issues center around two broad categories: (1) how to
measure charity care, and (2) how much of it is enough to justify
exemption. Neither of these issues is analyzed by the court decisions.
Because of the importance of these outstanding issues, this Article
considers them next.
1. Measuring Charity Care
The issue regarding how to measure charity care is an old one.
Academics writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s identified the
measurement problems: the dollar amount of charity care can be
measured by either the hospital's costs of care or its charges.' 10 If costs
are used, they can either be average costs (including overhead) or
marginal costs. 1
1
The methodology used for measuring charity care makes a huge
difference in the dollar amounts. Measuring charity care by charges
results in a higher dollar figure than measuring by costs, and measuring
by average costs results in a higher dollar figure than measuring by
marginal costs.
Although the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
(AICPA) standards for charity care reporting use charges as the measure
of charity care, 1 12 as a matter of theory, using charges to measure
charity care is patently ridiculous. In this regard, hospitals operate akin
to hotels, which have a "rack rate" for their rooms. Like the rack rate
on hotel rooms, virtually no one actually pays the hospital's "rack rate"
for services; instead, hospitals negotiate discounted reimbursement rates
with insurance companies, or such rates are set by the government as
part of the Medicare and Medicaid program. 1 13 Using charges as the
measure of charity care, therefore, would simply let hospitals inflate
110. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 25, at 55-56 (concluding that total average
costs present a fair measurement); Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit
Conversions: An Overview, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 9, 16 (noting that charity care
is "more accurately measured on a cost than a charge basis"); David A. Hyman, The Conundrum
of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 359 & n.
214 (1990) (describing the difficulty in measuring the provision of charity care).
I 1. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 25, at 55-56; Hyman, supra note 110, at 361. Marginal
cost refers to the excess cost of producing an additional unit. If, for example, producing ten units
of a product costs $10, but producing eleven units costs $10.50, the marginal cost of the eleventh
unit is $50. The average cost of all eleven units is $10.50 divided by 11, or about $.95.
112. AICPA, HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS-AICPA AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE
10.21 (2003).
113. See, e.g., Amy Fletcher, Hospital Charge Report Doesn't List True Costs, DENVER BUS.
J., Aug. 25, 2000, available at
http://www.bizjournals.comldenver/stories/2000/08/28/newscolumn3.html (describing how the
rates charged are determined by contracts and government regulations).
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their charity care "numbers" by setting higher prices for services that
they know will never be collected, or if collected at all, are charged only
to uninsured patients. 114 In fact, the Illinois court in Riverside seemed
to recognize this point by holding that a negotiated discount off the
"rack rate" between a hospital and an insurer or the government should
not count toward charity care.115 On the other hand, unreimbursed costs
(for example, Medicaid reimbursements that fail to fully cover average
costs) probably should count as charity care because this represents a
net cash outflow, although some academics disagree even on this. 116
As between average and marginal cost measures, a good case can be
made for either. The argument for marginal costs is that in the short
run, filling empty beds with charity patients or taking a few extra x-rays
with a machine already paid for costs very little, and hospitals should
not be "credited" in the charity care ledger with part of their overhead
and capital investment in providing these services, since those
investments would have to be made anyway for paying patients. Over
time, however, nonpaying patients represent a more or less permanent
burden on a hospital and will eventually require replacement of assets
sooner than would have been the case if the charity patients had not
been served. Thus, average costs (e.g., including overhead and
depreciation in the cost number) represent a better "true" measure of
charity care in the long run. Average costs, in fact, are the measure that
most academics use in measuring the value of charity care. 117  Also,
average costs are the measure used b' a number of states in legislation
relating to charity care reporting, " including the recently enacted
Community Benefits Act in Illinois' 19 (although states have also used
114. This problem of having a "rack rate" charge applicable only to uninsured patients has
itself created serious controversy and is one of the practices underlying the suits brought by
Richard Scruggs against exempt hospitals. See, e.g., Paul Barr, Changing Venues, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 14, 2005, at 14 (alleging that hospitals are "essentially hiding [their] charity
care from patients").
115. See supra text accompanying note 104 (noting that Riverside may have agreed to the
discounts in order to attract business).
116. Compare Claxton, supra note 110, at 16 (arguing that such amounts should be included),
with Hyman, supra note 110, at 360 n.219 (arguing that such amounts should not be included).
117. See Nancy M. Kane & William H. Wubbenhorst, Alternative Funding Policies for the
Uninsured: Exploring the Value of Hospital Tax Exemption, 78 MILBANK Q. 185, 190 (2000)
(stating that the majority of the literature on this topic uses average cost).
118. Id. (noting that Texas, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts use average cost measures in
their legislation).
119. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 76/1-76/99 (2004). The Act states that hospitals must report
charity care on the "actual cost of services provided based on the total cost to charge ratio derived
from the hospital's Medicare cost report[.]" 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 76/20.
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the marginal cost measure in some circumstances).12 °
The position of the courts in Highland Park, Alivio and Riverside that
bad debt should not count as charity care for purposes of justifying
exemption under the Methodist Old Peoples Home test, presents a
different kind of problem. One can certainly sympathize with the view
that from the standpoint of the patient, being accepted for treatment
with an up-front guarantee that the hospital will not seek payment is
better than being billed for treatment and hounded by collection efforts,
even if the ultimate result (no payment) is the same. But from the
standpoint of the hospital, both scenarios result in a lack of payment that
the hospital must make up for elsewhere to stay financially viable, and
there is little doubt that a significant portion of bad debt is in fact related
to the patient's financial inability to pay (and not to hospital inefficiency
or poor management of accounts receivable). 12l At the end of the day,
even a nonprofit organization has to make enough money to cover its
costs and set aside reserves for asset replacement and other capital
projects. If it cannot do so, it is not a financially viable enterprise and it
will go out of business.122 There is no magic money tree that nonprofit
hospital managers can go to and pick off $100 bills to pay their costs.
At some point, if government keeps piling on uncompensated care
obligations without some kind of offsetting revenue enhancement, the
hospital will simply no longer be able to operate. Thus, an absolute rule
that bad debts do not "count" as part of the justification for exemption
also seems wrong despite the courts' conclusions.
One possible compromise on this front would be to require hospitals
to have procedures in place to identify charity patients up-front, and
then to permit hospitals that in fact follow these procedures to include a
portion of bad debt in their charity care totals. Some academic studies
have shown that roughly 50% of hospital bad debt is likely due to
inability to pay, rather than simply debt avoidance or poor
management.l 3 As a result, this system would allow that 50% amount
to count toward charity care obligations in the same manner as any
other free care (that is, the cost of such care, whether measured on
120. Kane & Wubbenhorst, supra note 117, at 190 (noting that in the 1980s, New York,
Massachusetts and Maryland used marginal cost measures to reimburse hospitals for charity care
increases beyond a base year).
121. Claxton, supra note 110, at 16 & n.23.
122. Residents of Champaign-Urbana, for example, might recall that Burnham City Hospital
did just that-it went out of business because it could not generate revenues sufficient to cover its
costs.
123. See Kane & Wubbenhorst, supra note 117, at 191 (citing academic studies that suggest
that approximately 50% of bad debt reported by nonprofit hospitals is due to inability to pay,
rather than simply avoidance of payment).
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average or marginal basis, not the actual charge).
2. Justifying the Exemption
The second issue related to charity care is that Illinois law does not
provide any standard establishing how much charity care, however
measured, will be enough to justify exemption. The ALJ in Riverside
found that 3% of gross revenues dedicated to charity care was
insufficient to justify exemption, characterizing this amount as "de
minimis," even though national studies have shown that uncompensated
care rates across nonprofit institutions are not that much higher, at
roughly 4.5% of revenues, 124 and at least one state law uses 4% of
revenues as a target number for exemption. 125  The Third District
appeared to sympathize with the ALJ's de minimis view, but did not
opine on what percentage it thought would be significant.'2 6 So how
much is enough? Once again, there are several possible approaches that
raise different policy concerns.
First, I have argued, as have others, that as a minimum, we should
expect an exempt hospital to offer substantially more in charity care
than a for-profit hospital. 127 This is not a joke; as the discussion on bad
debt indicated, for-profit hospitals also have large amounts of
uncompensated care annually, although they generally refer to this free
care as bad debt, rather than charity care. 128 Some significant portion of129
this bad debt is related to the inability of patients to pay; so if one is
going to use uncompensated care as the touchstone for exemption, then
a nonprofit hospital at minimum should provide substantially more of
such care than similarly situated for-profit providers, who do not enjoy
the benefits of exemption. Otherwise, society is getting nothing for the
tax exemption over what it would get by simply repealing the
124. See Frank A. Sloan, Commercialism in Nonprofit Hospitals, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO
PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 151, 161 (Burton A.
Weisbrod ed., 1998) (noting that "[u]ncompensated-care data for 1994 showed nonprofits at 4.5
percent of revenues and for-profits at 4.0 percent").
125. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.1801(a)(2) (Vernon 2001).
126. Riverside Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 795 N.E.2d 361, 366-67 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist.
2003).
127. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 25, at 32 (noting that the value of the uncompensated
care should equal or exceed the exemption value).
128. See Sloan, supra note 124, at 161 (noting that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals serve
uninsured patients equally when they are in the same location). Obviously, in making this
comparison one should use the same methodology as for evaluating charity care (e.g., average
costs, not charges). See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty in
measuring the provision of charity care).
129. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text (stating that the inability of patients to
pay is sometimes the cause of bad debt rather than poor management).
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exemption and turning health care over to for-profit entities. Using
such a baseline, however, did not appear to be part of the court's
thinking in Riverside when it belittled Riverside's charity care
percentages.
Beyond requiring this minimum baseline, the question remains
whether the law should require a nonprofit to have its charity care dollar
amount "match" the amount of foregone tax revenues. Put another way,
should the law force a nonprofit to prove that it is "paying" for its
exemption by giving away care in an amount at least equal to the value
of exemption? Once again, neither the Highland Park, Alivio nor
Riverside courts contemplated this issue, and the answer is not as simple
as one might think.
Though many tax and health policy experts support the "matching"
approach, 130 others note that nonprofit hospitals may provide intangible
benefits that cannot be reduced to a dollar amount. Nonprofit hospitals,
for example, may provide a community-centered orientation,
community outreach, or education programs that similar for-profit
organizations may not provide. 13 1  Nonprofits might provide a better
environment to foster "trust" in health care, since patients presumably
will not have to worry that the hospital is cutting corners in order to
increase profits for shareholders. 132  Or the nonprofit might provide a
different mix of services and enhanced access to those services for its
community. One recent empirical study, for example, showed that
nonprofit hospitals are more likely to provide unprofitable services than
similarly situated for-profit hospitals. 1 Ultimately, one's view about
whether nonprofit hospitals should have to justify exemption by
130. E.g., Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and the Nonprofit Hospital: Is Tax-Exempt
Status Still Warranted?, 26 URBAN LAW. 143 (1994) (proposing to eliminate tax-exempt status
for nongovernmental nonprofit hospitals that fail to provide sufficient charity care to justify the
exemption); Kane & Wubbenhorst, supra note 117 (concluding that the efficient way to
redistribute resources, to match excess tax benefits to areas with the most need, is at the state
level); Alice A. Noble, A. L. Hyams & Nancy M. Kane, Charitable Hospital Accountability: A
Review and Analysis of Legal and Policy Initiatives, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 116 (1998)
(proposing that the standard of charity care be linked to the value of the tax exemptions).
131. E.g., Mark Schlesinger, Bradford Gray & Edward Bradley, Charity and Community: The
Role of Nonprofit Ownership in a Managed Health Care Systems, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
697 (1996) (noting that nonprofits provide various kinds of nonpecuniary benefits that increase
utility); J. David Seay, Tax-Exemption for Hospitals: Towards an Understanding of Community
Benefit, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 35 (1992) (commenting on Colombo and Hall's analysis).
132. The seminal work on trust in health care is Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
133. Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law and Ethics of
Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1362 n.89 (2003) (citing a study comparing
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals).
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showing that they give away care equal in value to the exemption
probably boils down to whether one believes that there are these
intangible, immeasurable benefits to the nonprofit form that ought to be
given weight in tax exemption analysis. Sound policymaking would
require that we at least consider if and how these intangibles work
before adopting a "matching" approach.
Finally, one can also make the argument that tying exemption to
charity care at all is simply bad health policy. A number of health
policy experts have opined that our health care system would be better
served by using entity-neutral direct subsidies for specific behaviors.
134
For example, if health care for the uninsured is a primary policy
concern, one could contemplate a system in which tax exemption for
health care providers is repealed, coupled with a state law mandate that
local communities must invest some substantial portion of the tax
dollars received as a result of repeal in local free-care pools for the poor,
or in which the tax dollars are used to increase the coverage for
Medicaid statewide. If properly administered, such a system might well
produce better health care results than a system of using tax exemption
to force charity care by hospitals, since a free-care pool or expanded
Medicaid could concentrate to some extent on preventive care, avoiding
the situation in which the uninsured wait until they are sick and then run
to the local emergency room for free care. 135 Virtually all health policy
experts agree that a focus on preventive care is far more efficient and
less costly to the health care system than waiting to treat people when
they are seriously ill, yet the focus of using tax exemption to provide
free care for the poor produces exactly that latter result.136 Moreover,
134. The "direct subsidy" approach also is favored by a number of commentators. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416,
1418 (1980) ("Current subsidization of and favoritism for nonprofits can only exacerbate some of
the troublesome consequences that flow from the prevalence of nonprofits."); Hyman supra, note
110, at 380 ("A shift to focused goals and away from an undifferentiated subsidy would better
serve the public interest by encouraging obviously desirable conduct."); David A. Hyman,
Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy and Regulatory Follies, 23 J. CORP. L. 741, 775-776 (1998)
("In short, organizational status leaves a great deal to be desired as a proxy for conduct-and
optimal subsidy policy would require that any and all subsidies be closely tied to conduct.").
Evelyn Brody has made a similar point on a more general plane, noting that "society might prefer
to subsidize charitable and other social outputs produced by all organizations rather than
subsidize nonprofits based on their organizational form." Evelyn Brody, Agents Without
Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms,
40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 461 (1996).
135. M. Gregg Bloche, Healthcare Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable
Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 369; Peter H. Schuck, Designing Hospital Care Subsidies for
the Poor, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 72, 77 (Frank A.
Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
136. See, e.g., American Heart Association, Preventive Health Care (2005),
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because doctors are not tax-exempt entities, there is no leverage in the
tax exemption system (unless they are employees of exempt hospitals)
to get them to treat patients for free; we hope that some do so as part of
their ethical obligations to their profession (just as we hope that some
lawyers do pro bono work), but hope and spotty realization of that hope
do not equal a functioning health care system.
B. Can Nonprofits Make Profits?
As noted above, the First District in Alivio also found that Alivio's
net profits violated the second factor in Methodist Old Peoples Home,
an argument repeated by the Champaign County Board of Review in its
challenges to Provena Covenant and Carle's exemptions. 137  This
conclusion, however, is simply absurd. All sorts of legitimate reasons
exist for nonprofits to earn a profit from their operations. In capital-
intensive organizations such as hospitals, profits are necessary to set
aside money in excess of depreciation for future replacement of plant
and equipment, 13 8  to provide contingency funds for unforeseen
liabilities, and to invest in improved services. Even if a nonprofit
targeted a "break-even" operation, prudent budgeting would often
produce a profit: no managing board would properly execute its duty of
care if it approved a budget without some cushion for unexpected
expenses or lower than expected revenues. In a "good" year, the
hospital would not use these contingency funds, resulting in an
accounting profit for the year.
The proper question associated with nonprofits making a profit is not
whether the organization earns a profit, but why--that is, what is the
organization's expected use of the profits? 139 One certainly should be
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=4734 (finding that an emphasis on
prevention is necessary because "[i]f all heart attack-prone people were treated surgically, the
cost would be prohibitive"); Sharon A. Falkenheimer, The Adequacy of Preventive Health Care:
Does the Health Care Provider Matter?, CENTER FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY, Sept. 24,
2004, http://www.cbhd.org/resources/healthcare/falkenheimer_2004-09-24.htm ("Preventing
chronic and/or often-incurable diseases such as breast cancer and emphysema certainly is
preferable to long-term clinical treatment, with its associated suffering, limitations, and costs.").
137. CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 7; PROVENA FILING, supra note 3, at 5.
138. Depreciation is an accounting expense, but simply setting aside the amount of cash equal
to annual depreciation would be insufficient to replace capital equipment because the costs of
replacement virtually always exceed the original cost due to inflation, equipment improvements,
etc. Thus a nonprofit would have to build in an accounting profit in its operations and set aside
some of that profit (along with the cash equal to depreciation) to insure it has sufficient future
funds to actually replace worn-out equipment or renovate worn-out buildings.
139. The Champaign Board of Review seemed to recognize this point in the Carle review,
where the Board stated that it "understands that the issue is not whether there was a profit, but
rather how that profit was treated." CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 7. The Board then seems to
assert that the profit must be devoted to charity care in order to be consistent with the second
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concerned if nonprofit organizations hoard profits for no apparent
reason instead of using those profits to reinvest in their charitable
purpose. But having profits per se simply cannot be an exemption
problem no matter what the language in Methodist Old Peoples Home.
The state policy issues raised by exempt organizations making
substantial profits have vexed federal exemption policy as well. 140 One
aspect of federal exemption law, however, might help resolve concerns
at the state level. In the federal tax world, the IRS has sometimes used a
"commensurate in scope" doctrine to assess whether the revenues
earned by an exempt organization are appropriately applied to charitable
purposes. The doctrine comes from a 1964 Revenue Ruling in which
the IRS approved exemption for an organization that derived its
revenues largely from commercial office building rent.14 ' These
profits, however, were then used by the organization to make grants to
other charitable entities. 142 The IRS opined that using the profits in this
manner was consistent with exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
because the organization was carrying on a charitable program of grant-
making "commensurate in scope with its financial resources."14 3 The
background to this ruling indicates that the IRS's view at the time was
that an exempt organization could make substantial profits as long as
those profits were dedicated to charitable purposes--that is, used to
subsidize charitable services. 
144
States could apply a similar kind of doctrine to property tax
exemptions, so that exempt organizations would have to provide an
explanation for why accumulations of profit are consistent with their
charitable purpose. Under such a provision, simply hoarding cash for
the sake of doing so (the equivalent of Scrooge McDuck taking a daily
dive into his money bin) would not be permitted. But if the exempt
entity could demonstrate that the profits were appropriately dedicated to
charitable purposes (e.g., placed in a reserve for future improvements or
capital replacements, or to expand services), then simply having profits
should not lead to an exemption problem.
criterion of Methodist Old Peoples Home. Id. As the text notes, however, there are many reasons
why a nonprofit organization might legitimately run financial surpluses.
140. See John D. Colombo, Regulating Commercial Activity by Exempt Charities:
Resurrecting the Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine, 39 EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 341 (2003)
(noting the conflict between an organization's exempt status and its ability to generate profits).
141. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-2 C.B. 186.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Colombo, supra note 140, at 347.
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C. The Role of Donations
The language of the third factor of the Methodist Old Peoples Home
test and the analysis of the Riverside court suggests that the receipt (or
lack thereof) of private donations should weigh heavily in exemption
analysis. The Champaign County Board of Review likewise focused on
a lack of donative support in its filing against Carle. 145 While I agree
with this stance as a policy matter,14  again this analysis raises policy
questions that the courts have simply failed to explore.
The theoretical case for using donations as an exemption criterion is
as follows. 147 One can think of charitable organizations as performing
functions that neither the private market nor government fulfill.
Charitable organizations often produce quasi-public goods that for
reasons of economic theory cannot be produced efficiently by for-profit
businesses, 14 8 and government may not fill this gap because of the
constraints of majoritarian politics. 149 In these circumstances, nonprofit
organizations step in to fill the service gap, and individuals donate to
these organizations in order to provide the economic resources
necessary to provide those services. Thus, donations are an excellent
"signal" that the public views a particular entity as undertaking
charitable activities. Accordingly, an excellent conceptual reason exists
to use donations as a measure of an entity's "charitable-ness."
Despite my enthusiasm for using donations as an integral part of tax
exemption policy, the empirical fact is that very few nonprofit hospitals
145. CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 7. The Board did not raise this point in the Provena
filing.
146. E.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 25, at 197-98 (noting the relevance of private
donations, but also the difficulty in setting the donative threshold in order to qualify the
organization as a charity); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991)
(critiquing the conventional and academic theories of the charitable tax exemption); Mark A. Hall
& John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1379 (1992) (finding that a donative theory of the charitable exemption is a stronger theory than
previously expounded theories).
147. See supra note 146 (citing sources explaining the donative theory).
148. For example, think about public television. Once a public TV station goes on the air,
everyone can watch it. Unless the station were to use a pay-per-view system, therefore, there is
no way for the station to charge viewers for the consumption of its product the way Starbucks can
charge individuals for coffee. Economists often refer to these characteristics as "durability" and
"indivisibility"--that is, when a public good is produced, it costs no more to supply it to many
people than to one person (durability) and there is no way to exclude "free riders" from enjoying
the benefit once the good is available (indivisibility). As a result, the private market cannot
produce public goods efficiently.
149. For example, high demanders of symphonic music probably do not constitute a majority
of the electorate; it is not possible, therefore, for this group to exercise majoritarian power to get
the government to fully fund symphonic orchestras.
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receive significant donations. Recent data shows that, overall, nonprofit
hospitals receive less than 2% of their revenues from private
philanthropy, 150 although individual hospitals, such as the Shriners
children's hospitals, may rely far more heavily on donations.
151
Making significant donations a central part of the test for property tax
exemption, therefore, would be the equivalent of ending exemption for
most hospitals and other health care providers. If Illinois (or some other
state) wants to be the first jurisdiction to adopt my "donative theory" of
exemption, 152 I certainly am not opposed to such an approach, but as
with the other doctrinal points noted above, I would prefer that happen
with some public debate and knowledge of the consequences rather than
by accident of judicial language.
D. "Exclusive Use" and Independent Contractors
Although the issue was not raised in Highland Park, Alivio, or
Riverside, the fifth and sixth elements of the Methodist Old Peoples
Home test both involve the exclusive use requirement of property tax
exemption. The exclusive use provision figured heavily in the
Champaign County Board of Review's filings against Provena and
Carle. In the Provena case, the Board cited several instances in which
Provena had contracted with for-profit service providers in order to
provide medical services to hospital patients. 153 In the Carle case, the
Board focused on the hospital's relationship with the for-profit Carle
Clinic (a group of doctors), which provided the bulk of health services
in the hospital. 154  According to the Board of Review, these
arrangements in both cases potentially violated the "exclusive use" test
for exemption in Illinois law because they allowed private parties to use
property for profit-making purposes. Because the hospitals refused to
provide details of the use of facilities by these for-profit entities, the
Board concluded that the taxpayers had failed to carry their burden of
proof to establish exempt use.
In the context of the actual cases, the Board of Review certainly was
150. Lester M. Salamon, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 79 (2d ed. 1999).
151. Hall & Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 146, at 410 n.
365.
152. The donative theory that Mark Hall and I proposed would tie eligibility for tax exemption
to a nonprofit's ability to show that donations were a substantial part of the organization's
operating revenues each year. We suggested that "substantial part" be defined as one-third of
operating revenues, tested on a three-year rolling-average basis, though we also acknowledge that
the percentage could be set lower for certain traditional charities. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note
25, at 198-201.
153. PROVENA FILING, supra note 3, at 2-5.
154. CARLE FILING, supra note 4, at 10.
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entitled to ask for documentation from the hospitals regarding their
relationships with these various entities, and without such
documentation (which the Board alleged the hospitals failed to provide),
to suspect the worst. As with the federal system, the taxpay'er has the
practical burden of proof in state property tax matters. ' 5" But the
relationships between the hospitals and both third-party for-profit
organizations and sibling entities raise some broader legal issues that
are unresolved. For purposes of further analysis, I am going to assume
that whatever arrangements Provena and Carle had with third-party
providers using their facilities were negotiated at arm's length and that
in fact neither organization simply transferred wads of cash to either
unrelated or related for-profit entities for no reason. If the latter were
true, it clearly violates the private inurement proscription under both
federal and state law, rendering these easy exemption revocation cases.
Rather, the more interesting question is whether arm's-length
arrangements with third-party for-profit service providers might imperil
exempt status. The Board of Review's filing hints that this might be so
under the theory that employing private, for-profit firms to provide
patient services separately billed by the for-profit companies results in a
for-profit use of hospital facilities, contrary to the exclusive use
requirement. Moreover, the "private benefit" prohibition of federal law
described above also suggests that arm's-length arrangements with third
parties can create exemption problems. 1
56
A variety of Illinois cases hold that when property owned by a charity
is used primarily to produce a profit, as opposed to primarily for
charitable purposes, the property is not exempt. 57 Thus, Illinois courts
once held that a thrift shop operated by the Salvation Army was taxable
because its primary purpose was to generate income for the Salvation
Army's charitable works. 158  But as with the issue of an exempt
155. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/904 establishes a presumption that a tax assessment made by the
Department of Revenue is correct. Challenging the statutory presumption, therefore, requires the
taxpayer to assume the burden of going forward to rebut the statutory presumption. See generally
Richard L. Ryan, Department of Revenue Procedure, in ILLINOIS STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
§§ 8.81, 8.84 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 2004) (outlining the Department
of Revenue's case and the taxpayer's burdens at a tax deficiency hearing).
156. See United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a contract between charity and fundraiser might raise private benefit concerns even if
negotiated at arm's length).
157. For a general discussion of the exclusive use provision in Illinois law and extensive case
citations, see Mark R. Davis and Hon. Randye A. Kogan, Taxable and Exempt Property, in REAL
ESTATE TAXATION § 1.53 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 2001).
158. Salvation Army v. Dep't of Revenue, 524 N.E.2d 628 (ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988). This
result later was overturned by legislation. See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-65(b) (2004)
(describing the charitable organizations rules for exemption).
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organization making a profit, the proposition that arrangements between
a charity and independent contractors to provide services to or on behalf
of the charity create exclusive use problems is simply incorrect.
Charities contract with for-profit entities for all sorts of common
services in order to perform their charitable function. Charities enter
into contracts with third parties for electrical service, phone service,
maintenance and janitorial services, insurance, etc. All these third-party
providers presumably make a profit on the services they provide to the
charity; if using independent for-profit contractors to help provide
services endangers exemption, then virtually all charitable organizations
are at risk.
Even if it were limited to the relatively unique circumstances of the
health care sector, such a rule makes no sense. For example, doctors
routinely bill separately for the services they provide to patients in a
hospital context. When a person has surgery in a hospital, that person
typically gets two bills: one from the doctor for her professional
services in performing the surgery and the other from the hospital for
the use of the facilities. If one accepted the Board of Review's theory
of exclusive use, a doctor's use of hospital facilities to provide services
to patients for which the doctor separately bills and makes a profit on
would violate exemption standards. Accordingly, the proposition, as a
broad statement, is wrong.
The case precedents also do not support such a broad reading of the
exclusive use requirement. The question for Illinois property tax
purposes is whether the property is used for the charitable purpose, not
whether third parties are making profits by supplying services for that
use. Thus the Salvation Army Thrift Store was a problem because
operating a retail store for profit was not a charitable use. 159 Similarly,
a portion of a building owned by an exempt hospital and used by a for-
profit pharmacy would not be exempt, but the portion of that same
building used for management services for the hospital would be.
160
In the Provena Covenant case, however, there is no doubt that the
hospital used its building and grounds to provide health services to
patients. The correct question is whether the hospital provided these
health services on an overall charitable basis, not how the services were
provided (e.g., whether the services were provided via contract with for-
159. Evangelical Hosp. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 584 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (Itl. App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1991) ("Salvation Army is distinguishable because in that case the thrift shop was operating
solely as a store to make profits which in turn were used to reduce the costs of a charitable
organization. In short, the property was used as a store.").
160. Id.
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profit third parties) or whether bills came from for-profit entities. If
Provena provided services that met the other four factors in Methodist
Old Peoples Home, it clearly met the exclusive use requirement since its
building and grounds were used to provide those services literally
twenty-four hours per day. Specifically, one cannot imagine that if
Provena Covenant devoted all its surplus funds to providing free care
for the uninsured, the fact it employed for-profit third parties to help it
do so would have negative exemption consequences.
Nevertheless, the Champaign County Board of Review may have
stumbled on a somewhat different legitimate concern. Suppose that an
ostensibly charitable organization has so many arrangements with
external service providers that it really is nothing more than a shell
acting as a sort of "broker" between service recipients and for-profit
service providers. In such a case, even if the arrangements with the for-
profit service providers are negotiated at arm's length (so that there is
no private inurement argument), one might legitimately question
whether the revenues funneled through the charitable "broker" could be
expended more judiciously by providing such services directly and thus
avoiding the profit-margin and overhead of the external for-profit
providers.
A better way to address this core concern than the exclusive use
argument, however, would be to adopt something akin to a limited
version of the private benefit rule of federal exemption law described
above. 16 1 That is, either the state legislature or the courts might state as
a requirement for exemption that when a charitable organization
employs for-profit outside independent contractors to provide core
services to the organization's charitable class, the charity must justify
why that arrangement is appropriate to further its charitable mission.
As with GCM 39,862, that justification cannot be simply administrative
or economic convenience, but one could imagine situations in which
"contracting out" services would be necessary to providing such
services at all, 162 or would be cheaper than providing them in-house,
thus saving the charity money to expend on other charitable services. In
other cases, contracting with for-profit service providers or entering into
161. See supra Part II.C (summarizing the private benefit rule that requires an exempt
organization to justify why it entered into a transaction that results in economic benefits for a
private individual or organization).
162. For example, one accountant I talked to who did auditing for several nonprofit hospitals
noted that one of his clients contracted with an independent group of doctors to provide
emergency room services because no other staff doctors in the area wanted to do emergency room
work. In this case, the external contract is easily justified: absent the contract arrangement, the
hospital in question would have been unable to staff its emergency room and provide emergency
services to its service area.
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joint-venture arrangements might be necessary to expand services. For
example, one could imagine an exempt hospital entering into a joint
venture arrangement to provide psychiatric care or drug rehabilitation
services that were not otherwise provided by the hospital. By limiting
this requirement to core services, we would relieve charities of the
obligation to explain the rationale for hiring a private janitorial service
and avoid the reductio ad absurdem that an expanded view of the
exclusive use argument presents.
E. Complex Corporate Structures
The final issue raised by the Champaign County Board of Review,
particularly in the Provena case, also is not directly addressed in the
Illinois court decisions. That issue involves whether internal funds
transfers between Provena and its parent corporation and other sibling
entities raise potential exemption problems.' 6
Health care providers in particular often use complex parent and
subsidiary structures to isolate liability for particular operations in a
single corporate container in order to protect other assets or to satisfy
regulatory concerns. 164  As with the existence of profits or use of
independent contractors, the array of legitimate business reasons for
163. PROVENA FILING, supra note 3, at 8.
164. See, e.g., Highland Park Hosp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 507 N.E.2d 1331, 1340 (1Il. App. Ct.
2d Dist. 1987) (Dunn, J. dissenting) ("[Tihe hospital formed five corporations to provide
flexibility and protection of assets for the total organization."). For another example of a complex
corporate structure used by a health care provider, see Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 100 T.C.
394, 395-96 (1993). As explained by the Tax Court:
Petitioner [GHP] owned and operated a health maintenance organization (HMO) under
the Pennsylvania Health Maintenance Organization Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, secs.
1551-1567 (Supp. 1991). Petitioner was one of nine related organizations. The eight
other organizations, referred to collectively as the Geisinger system and described
below, were the Geisinger Foundation (the Foundation), Geisinger Medical Center
(GMC), Geisinger Clinic (the Clinic), Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center
(GWV), Marworth, Geisinger System Services (GSS), and two professional liability
trusts. Each of these eight entities was recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as
an exempt organization described in sections 170(b)(l)(A)(iii), 501(c)(3), and
509(a)(1).
The Foundation controlled petitioner and the other entities in the Geisinger system, as
well as three for-profit corporations.
Id.
In many states, HMOs must be separately incorporated to meet state regulatory requirements, and
in any event it would be good management for the board of a health care provider to isolate the
potential tort liability for the operation of an HMO from core hospital assets (or vice versa). See,
e.g., MANCINO, supra note 22, at § 6.02[2][a][iv] (noting that the subsidiary HMOs at issue in the
Geisinger exemption case were formed for "several regulatory, governance and system-wide
organizational and management reasons").
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using complex structures means that these structures should not be
inherently suspect from an exemption standpoint. Nevertheless, such
structures do raise two potential issues.
The first is the standard private inurement concern that any payments
by an exempt organization to a for-profit sibling be only for the fair
market value of goods or services provided to the exempt organization.
Any violation of this fair-market-value rule is a violation of the private
inurement prohibition (because charitable revenues are being diverted to
a for-profit entity and ultimately to the benefit of that entity's equity
owners) and should result in immediate revocation of exempt status.
The second is the question of what to do about "dividend"
distributions from an exempt subsidiary to an exempt parent that are not
fair-market-value payments for services rendered. 165 In Provena's case,
for example, one of the things that troubled the Board of Review was
the distributions made by Provena Covenant to its parent Provena
Health. From a corporate standpoint, of course, such distributions are
perfectly legal within normal corporate law constraints. But the
difficulty with such transfers is that property tax exemption uniquely
burdens local government. If exempt entity B earns a profit (e.g., has
revenues in excess of expenses) and transfers that profit to a parent A as
a distribution (as opposed to payment for equal-value goods or services
received), the amount of the distributed profit up to the value of the
property tax exemption for B essentially is money transferred from the
local community granting exemption (the foregone taxes) to the parent
corporation for possible use elsewhere. Provena Health, for example,
owns hospitals in a number of Illinois cities other than Urbana. 166  If
Provena Covenant makes a distribution to Provena Health (the parent),
which is then used by the parent corporation to subsidize operations in
Joliet, Urbana taxpayers have a right to ask why they subsidized health
care in Joliet.
167
165. Obviously, distributions to a for-profit enterprise would violate the private inurement
prohibition, since those profits could then be distributed to individual owners.
166. Provena Health operates hospitals in Danville, Aurora, Elgin, Joliet and Kankakee.
Debra Pressey, Provena plans intensive care improvements, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS-
GAZETTE ON-LINE, July 19, 2004,
http://www.newsgazette.comlocalnews/story.cfm?Number= 16392.
167. Two courts have faced a similar issue and reached opposite conclusions. In Banner
Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242 (S.D. 2003), the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the
proceeds of the sale of a local nonprofit hospital by a nonprofit parent corporation could be
subject to a charitable trust, requiring the proceeds to be set aside for the benefit of the local
community served by the hospital. Under the same facts, however, a North Dakota trial court
dismissed a complaint by the North Dakota Attorney General to impose a charitable trust on the
proceeds of the sale of assets by a charitable parent corporation. North Dakota ex rel Stenehjem
v. Banner Health Sys., Civ. No. 09-02-C4093 2003 WL 501821 (D.N.D. 2002). Both cases
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This concern obviously would be alleviated by a requirement that an
exempt hospital provide charity care in the local community in an
amount at least equal to the value of the tax exemption. Absent such a
requirement (which, as noted above, has its own set of problems), the
question of profit distribution raises larger concerns about whether
private organizations in effect should be permitted to redistribute tax
dollars from one community to another. As a legal matter, such
distributions would not appear to violate Illinois law, at least as long as
the distributed revenues are used elsewhere for charitable purposes,
even if such use was in another state. 168 As a policy matter, however,
the legislature certainly might consider a requirement that an exempt
organization may not distribute dividends to a parent charitable
organization except to the extent profits exceed the value of the local
property tax exemption. Such a prohibition would at least insure that
the value of the local property tax exemption is not transferred from the
local community (although it does not guarantee that those funds would
be used wisely by the hospital to benefit the local community).
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in Part IV of this Article illustrates that the
question of what doctrinal tests the court should employ to govern
property tax exemption for hospitals and other health care providers is
far more complex than popular press accounts might lead one to believe
or than the Illinois courts may have realized. One can hardly blame the
courts, however, for lacking the expertise in health care or tax policy to
appropriately recognize the pitfalls inherent in interpreting property tax
exemption rules. Even the Internal Revenue Service, whose job it is to
think more comprehensively about tax policy and its far-reaching
eventually settled out of court, with Banner agreeing to pay a lump sum to each state for local
health projects. Harold L. Kaplan, Patrick S. Coffey & Rosemary G. Feit, The "Charitable
Trust" Doctrine: Lessons and Aftermath of Banner Health, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. No. 4 (May
2004), available at http://www.gcd.com/ourpeople (follow "K" hyperlink; then follow "Kaplan,
Harold L." hyperlink; then follow "The 'Charitable Trust' Doctrine: Lessons and Aftermath of
Banner Health" hyperlink). While the Banner cases involved an asset sale and the potential
removal of the assets from the state, the same issues would seem to arise in distributions of profit
from a local hospital to a non-local parent corporation for use outside the local geographic area.
168. The Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act does limit the ability of a nonprofit
corporation to make distributions of assets, but it also states that "[any payment or transfer of
money, property or other assets in furtherance of any of the purposes of the corporation shall not
be deemed a distribution for the purposes of this Article .. " 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/109.10
(2004). Therefore, as long as the distributed money is used for "the purposes of the corporation"
(e.g., charitable purposes, in the case of an exempt charity), a distribution should not run afoul of
Illinois statutory law. Id.
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effects, has fallen into a similar trap.169
But the policy problems identified above are real, and they demand
the serious attention of the legislature, rather than piecemeal attention
by courts followed by a spasm of legislative action when newspaper
headlines roar. Without such consideration, the process of individual
adjudication by litigation almost certainly will result in ill-conceived tax
and health policy as a by-product of defining charitable property tax
exemption. The people of Illinois (and other states where these issues
may arise) and the uninsured who are directly affected by these policy
decisions deserve better.
169. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 26, at 277-78 (noting that the IRS in effect was making
health policy when it issued Rev. Rul. 69-545 and was neither well-equipped to do so nor
accountable for the effects of its decision on health policy).
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ADDENDUM
As this Article was going to press, the Illinois Attorney General's
office released a draft of proposed new legislation called the Tax-
Exempt Hospital Responsibility Act. The Act would impose new
charity-care requirements (as well as reporting requirements) on
hospitals exempt from Illinois Property Tax. The Act was introduced in
the Illinois House on January 23, 2006.170
The primary requirement of the proposed legislation is to impose a
specific legal obligation on tax-exempt hospitals to treat charity
patients. In this regard, the Act would clear up some of the confusion
regarding an exempt hospitals' charity care obligations that the Article
notes in Part IV.A. 1, above. As drafted, the Act seems to impose two
separate obligations on exempt hospitals. One obligation is to provide
free care to any uninsured Illinois resident with family income equal to
or less than 150% of the federal poverty level. In addition, the Act
requires exempt hospitals to provide sliding-scale discounts to patients
with family income between 150% and 250% of the federal poverty
level. 1
7 1
The second obligation is that a hospital would be required to furnish
an amount of charity care at least equal to eight percent of the hospital's
total operating costs as reported on its Medicare cost reports. 17 The
interaction of this eight percent requirement with the obligation to treat
poverty-level patients is somewhat unclear. As drafted, the poverty-
level care requirements and eight percent requirement appear to be
independent. That is, a hospital must meet all its poverty-level charity
care obligations even if that results in charity care above the eight
percent requirement, and conversely, if that happens to be less than
eight percent, then a hospital must "expand" its charity care to meet the
eight percent floor.
With respect to the eight percent requirement, the Act appears to
170. H.B. 5000, 94th Gen. Assembly, 2006. A summary is available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=5000&GAID=8&DocTypelD=HB&Leg
Id=24242&SessionlD=50&GA=94 (last viewed 1/30/2006). The complete bill is available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/94/HB/PDF/09400HB50001v.pdf
See, e.g., Lori Rackl, Madigan: Hike charity care, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 23, 2006.
171. Act Section 15. Under this sliding scale, no bill can exceed between 20% and 35% of the
actual cost of services. In addition, to the extent that services exceed $10,000 in any twelve-
month period, the excess must be provided free of charge to this group of residents. According to
the Chicago Sun Times, in 2005, the federal poverty limit was $9,570 for a single person and
$19,350 for a family of four. Rackl, supra note 1.
172. Act Section 25.
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define charity care with reference to a hospital's marginal costs,
although this also is somewhat unclear. In Section 10 of the Act, the
definition of "charity care" is "medically necessary services provided
without charge or at a reduced charge to patients who meet eligibility
criteria no more restrictive than those set forth in Sections 15 and 20 of
this Act." That language seems to define charity care as any care
provided at less than the hospital's standard charge. 173  But then in
Section 25, the Act states that a hospital can demonstrate that it meets
its eight percent obligation "by documenting the costs" of charity care
provided under the Act. That language seems to imply that the eight
percent obligation will be judged with reference to a hospital's "costs"
rather than charges, and the Act defines costs as "the actual expense a
hospital incurs to provide each service or supply."'i74 This definition of
costs as "actual expense a hospital incurs" seems to adopt a marginal
cost approach to valuing charity care, which is the most strict of the
three approaches (charges, average costs or marginal costs) discussed in
the Article. The Act also makes clear that bad debt write-offs do not
qualify as "charity care"; only free or discounted care for which the
hospital expects no payment and is never recorded as revenue, an
account receivable, or bad debt qualifies. 175 Medicaid reimbursement
shortfalls (that is, the amount by which reimbursements fail to cover
"costs" as defined), however, are included in the charity care number, 176
and hospitals would also be able to count contributions to community
health centers. 177  A companion bill, the Fair Hospital Billing and
Collection Practices Act, would regulate the way hospitals collect bills
from patients.1
78
Although Attorney General Madigan has agreed with legislative
leaders not to pursue passage of the legislation in the current session, at
least the bill has put the issue of tax-exemption for nonprofit hospitals
in the legislative domain, where it belongs, and has provided an opening
for a thorough discussion of the issues raised. If my interpretation of
the main provisions of the bill are correct, then it at least answers the
question posed in the Article about "how much charity care is enough"
173. The Act defines "charge" as "the price set by a hospital for a specific service or supply
provided by the hospital." Act Section 10.
174. Act Section 10.
175. Id.
176. Act Section 25(b)(5).
177. Act Section 25(b)(2).
178. H.B. 4999, 94th Gen. Assembly, 2006. A summary of this bill is available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=4999&GAID=8&DocTypelD=HB&Leg
Id=24241 &SessionlD=50&GA=94
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and also seems to have adopted one of the two sensible approaches to
measurement of charity care (marginal cost).
Unfortunately, the bill fails to address any of the other issues raised
by the Article concerning the judicial definition of exemption for
nonprofit hospitals. The bill itself states in Section 45 that it does not
displace other requirements for tax exemption. 179 Hence the issues
identified in the Article regarding profits, exclusive use, donations, and
complex entities remain unresolved. Moreover, the bill itself does not
answer what is perhaps the most important policy question identified in
the Article, which is whether tying tax exemption to specific charity
care levels is in fact good health policy. For example, would the State
be better off by simply collecting the eight percent minimum amount
from each hospital and investing that in preventive care for the poor or
using it to buy coverage for the poor in an HMO? These overarching
policy issues are now on the table; let us hope that the legislature
debates them with the seriousness and careful attention they deserve.
179. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as relieving any hospital of any other legal
obligation under the Illinois Constitution, or under any other statute or the common law,
including, without limitation, obligations of tax-exempt hospitals to furnish charity care or
community benefits, or as reducing any such obligation on the part of any hospital." Act Section
45.
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